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RECENT CASE NOTES
Estate Taxation - Net Estate - Time of
Valuation of Claims Against Estate
Estate at the time of decedent's death had a claim against it by
virtue of a divorce decree between the decedent and his wife. The
decree required decedent to pay his wife forty dollars per week until
her death or remarriage and provided that these payments would
be a charge against decedent's estate if he should predecease his wife.
After decedent's death on July 8, 1952, his administrator continued
to make weekly payments until June 1953, when the wife remarried.
In the estate tax return, filed on July 28, 1953, decedent's adminis-
trator sought a deduction under section 812(b) (3)' of $27,058.30,
the actuarial present value of his wife's right to future payments
computed as of the time of decedent's death, which the Tax Court
held was correct. Held, reversed: Where, prior to the date on which
the estate tax return is filed, the total amount of a claim against the
estate is clearly established under state law, the estate may obtain
no greater deduction than the established sum even though the
amount is ascertained through events occurring after decedent's
death. Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.
1960).
The federal estate tax is a tax imposed upon the transfer of the
entire "net estate" and not upon any particular legacy, devise, or
distributive share.' Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 the
basis for the estate tax was the "net estate," i.e., the "gross estate"
less allowable exemptions and deductions.' Among the deductions are
claims against the estate allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction
under which the estate is being administered.4 The amounts that may
be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are only those that
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812, in pertinent parts, reads as follows:
For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined,
in the case of a citizen or resident of the United States by deducting from
the value of the gross estate -
(b) Expenses, losses, indebtedness and taxes. Such amounts -
(3) for claims against the estate,
as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the
United States, under which the estate is being administered . ...
aNew York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (1958).
ant. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 810, 860, 935. Under the 1954 Code the basis is the
"taxable estate" which is computed in substantially the same manner. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2053(a).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(b); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053 (a).
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represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time
of his death, whether or not then matured. Thus, a claim based upon
an agreement by which a wife relinquishes her right to support dur-
ing her husband's life in consideration of sums payable in whole or
in part at or after his death is not deductible from the husband's gross
estate.! However, if a separation agreement is incorporated in a
divorce decree, the claim given by the divorce court is not founded
upon a promise or agreement, but upon the command of the court,
and thus the claim is allowable as a deduction." A claim may even
be deductible though it is contingent at the time of death.' Since it
has long been the custom in federal courts to use actuarial tables in
order to appraise the value of future interests,9 they are often used
in computing the amount deductible from the value of the gross
estate for estate tax purposes where the claim against the estate is
for future payments due a decedent's divorced wife under a divorce
decree."
The time at which the net estate is to be valued for federal
estate tax purposes has varied in the past. One theory establish-
ing death as the time at which the estate is to be valued was
based on the principle that the tax is on the act of the testator
passing the property and not on the receipt of the property by
the heirs, legatees or devisees;" therefore, since the property passes
at the time of the death of the decedent, subsequent events should
not affect the value of the estate for the purposes of taxation."
However, a series of cases beginning with Herold v. Kahn" enunciat-
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
Adriance v. Higgins, 113 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1940); Helvering v. United States Trust
Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940); Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367 (2d
Cir. 1940).
'Since a divorce court is free to disregard all allowances made in a separation agree-
ment, the allowances are the court's own, even in cases where it expressly accepted as
proper the allowances actually agreed upon in the separation agreement. Commissioner v.
Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Swink, 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir.
1946); Yoke v. Fleming, 145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. State St.
Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (Ist Cir. 1942); Mason's Estate, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941); Edythe
C. Young, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939).
'Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621
(1941); Commissioner v. Kelley, 84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603
(1936); Stewart v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1931); Percy B. Eckhart, 33
B.T.A. 426 (1935).
Simpson v. United States, 252 U.S. 547 (1920).
'°Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1899).
" Hooper v. Bradford, 178 Mass. 95, 59 N.E. 678 (1901) (Holmes, C.J.), construed
Mass. Pub. Stat. 1891, ch. 425, which fixed no time at which value was to be taken for
inheritance tax purposes. The case has been widely followed by the federal courts. E.g.,
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929) (Holmes, J.); Robbins v. Com-
missioner, 111 F.2d 828 (1st Cir. 1940); Myers v. United States, 51 F.2d 145 (Ct. Cl.
1931).
3159 Fed. 608 (3d Cir. 1908).
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ed the view that although liability for the tax is fixed at the time
of the decedent's death, often the amount of the net estate can be
determined only by facts occurring subsequent to death; the use
of mortality tables to ascertain a life expectancy which affects the
value of the net estate is only justified when no better evidence is
available. Thus, if the value of a life interest is known before pay-
ment of taxes, that value should be used.1" More recent cases, how-
ever, have repudiated this theory in certain situations. With respect
to the time of valuing decedent's net estate when the remainder of
the estate will go to charity after termination of a life estate, Ithaca
Trust Co. v. United States" returned to the earlier doctrine, holding
that the estate transferred is to be valued as of the time of the
testator's death, i.e., the time when the testator transfers the property.
This doctrine has been applied: where a remainder was willed to a
charitable organization;'" where part of the estate involved bonds
and the decedent died between the bonds' interest payment dates;1
where between the time of death of the decedent and the date when
the tax was to be paid, the estate, consisting largely of stocks, rose in
value; 8 where a contingent claim against the estate was present at
the time of the death of the decedent but was void at the time of
the payment of the tax, the claim differing from that in the principal
case only in that it was for a definite, known amount rather than for
an amount to be determined by mortality tables."'
The decision in the principal case indicates a return to the Herold
v. Kahn doctrine," for the first basis for the court's decision was that
the net estate is not to be determined as of the time of death if
14 Union Trust v. Heiner, 19 F.2d 362 (W.D. Pa. 1927); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Nichols, 18 F.2d 660 (D. Mass. 1927).
15279 U.S. 151 (1929). Testator devised a life estate with a remainder to a charity.
At the time of his death, the life tenant was still alive, but died before expiration of the
time for filing the tax return. Hence, the facts are similar to those in the principal case.
" Delbridge v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Estate of Kirkwood,
23 B.T.A. 955 (1931).
'Estate of King, 18 T.C. 414 (1952). The court held that the net estate was to be
valued without including the amount of interest later received.
"Hooper v. Bradford, 178 Mass. 95, 59 N.E. 678 (1901). See note 12 supra.
SWiner v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
'0 276 F.2d at 375. The court states that the purpose of § 812(b) is:
[T]o define that portion of the property of a decedent that is subject to an
estate tax and in so doing it eliminates from estate taxation those portions
of decedent's gross estate that do not pass by way of a gift taking effect at
death and those portions that although they do pass, pass by way of tax-
exempt gift . . . . Obviously this purpose would not be served if a deduc-
tion were permitted for claims against an estate which though having
vitality as of date of death, could never be enforced as of the day the
estate tax return is filed. The property which might have been subject to
such a claim were it enforceable is now certain to pass by way of a gift
taking effect at death. To permit an estate such a deduction would be to
prefer fiction to reality and defeat the clear purpose of Section 812.
[Vol. 15
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subsequent events provide certainty as to its value. However, even
cases supporting this doctrine admit that if by the time of payment
of the tax the subsequent events have not occurred, the estate is to
be determined by claims present at the time of death on the basis
of computations through mortality tables regardless of when there-
after the contingency occurs." These cases point out that the purpose
of section 812 (b) is to determine that portion of the property of
the decedent subject to an estate tax and to eliminate those portions
of decedent's gross estate that do not pass by devise or descent." Thus,
although at death it may appear that because of a claim against the
estate a portion of the estate will not pass by devise or descent, if before
the filing of an estate tax return the claim is no longer present, then
this property becomes certain to pass by devise or descent. Therefore,
it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when facts are known,
and since mortality tables are not required to be used, the actual fact
rather than a mere convenient fiction should determine the estate.23
The court, however, overlooked the fact that, since many claims at the
time of the death of the decedent may well be contingent, subse-
quent events may cause the contingency to occur and defeat the
claim, thus causing the heirs, legatees and devisees to receive a dif-
ferent amount of property from that which was passed at the time
of death. If subsequent events are determinative, the tax is essentially
upon receipt of the property, which is contrary to the weight of
authority that the tax is on the act of the testator and not on the
receipt of the property, 4 i.e., the value of the estate should be
determined as of the time when the act is done, the decedent's death.
The second basis for the decision in the principal case was that
section 812(b) permits deduction only of those claims against the
estate which are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction under which
the estate is being administered," and, since the claim in question
was never allowed by a state court, it is unenforceable. The court,
however, ignored authority that the term "allowed" is not to be
construed to mean that, unless a claim has been allowed by the state,
no deduction will be permitted. Deductibility is not conditioned on
21Herold v. Kahn, 159 Fed. 608 (3d Cir. 1908).
22Kahn v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
2 See case cited note 21 supra.
24Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1899); Winer v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Delbridge v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 845
(E.D. Mich. 1950); Estate of King, 18 T.C. 414 (1952); Estate of Kirkwood, 23 B.T.A.
955 (1931); Hooper v. Bradford, 178 Mass. 95, 59 N.E. 678 (1901).
25 See statute cited note 1 supra.
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the claim's allowance by a local court, but rather upon its enforce-
ability under local law.'
In certain situations, e.g., the passing of a remainder of the estate
as a tax-exempt gift to charity, the law is definitely established that
mortality tables at the time of death should be used in determining
the life interest rather than events subsequent to death."' An analogy
to the charity cases should be valid in deciding the claims cases.
Moreover, the policy for the determination of the gross estate (from
which the claims are deducted to determine the net estate) is that
death is the time at which it should be valued."8 However, the value
of the gross estate may be determined, if the executor so elects, by
valuing the property at a date one year after the death of the
decedent.' Unless the optional valuation date is selected, the value
to be employed is the fair market value on the date of death; events
occurring subsequent to that time do not influence the valuation."0
It seems totally inconsistent that, in reference to the gross estate,
which very often may be influenced by subsequent events, one theory
would be followed, while, in reference to the net estate, a completely
different theory would be followed. It would certainly be more
logical if the reasoning of the established law for determination of
gross estates and of net estates with remainders to tax-exempt chari-
ties were also the reasoning in cases involving the determination of
net estates where contingent claims are present.
James C. Slaughter
"SSmyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955); Winer v. United States, 153 F.
Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1958).
27 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
"
5Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2031.
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2032 (a).
"'Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift & Estate Taxation 5 52.10 (1958).
[Vol. 15
